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Citizens’ reactions to the 
Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria through the social 
media are widespread, as 
they apply pragmatic acts 
to express varied feelings 
and opinions, mostly con-
demning the activities of 
the terrorist sect, some 
demanding a total breakup 
of Nigeria.
Twittering the Boko Haram Uprising in 
Nigeria: Investigating Pragmatic Acts 
in the Social Media
Innocent Chiluwa and Adetunji Adegoke
This paper investigates pragmatic acts in the discourse of 
tweeters and online feedback comments on the activities 
of Boko Haram, a terrorist group in Nigeria. The tweets and 
comments illustrate acts used to express revolutionary feel-
ings and reflect what people say and imply in times of crisis. 
Tweets about Boko Haram are speech and pragmatic acts that 
denounce the Nigerian government, reject Western education, 
and call for support. Tweets and reactions from non-Muslims 
and nonradical Muslims condemn terrorism and denounce 
the terrorist group. While some tweets simply offer sugges-
tions on how to curtail the Boko Haram insurgency, others 
seek the breakup of Nigeria, granting political and religious 
independence to the north and the southeast of the country.
Several bomb attacks attributed to a radical Islamist sect known as Boko 
Haram appear to have held Nigeria for ransom in the last few years. Founded 
in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, a Muslim cleric, in Maiduguri in northeastern 
Nigeria, Boko Haram has carried out a series of attacks on churches, the 
police, and public facilities in northern Nigeria. In June 2009, this group, 
also known as the Nigerian Taliban, carried out an armed uprising, which, 
according to its own statements, was an effort to rid the country of cor-
ruption and Islamize the northern states. This action was resisted by the 
Nigerian military, resulting in the death of more than seven hundred people, 
mostly members of the sect. During the uprising, Yusuf and other members, 
including Yusuf’s father-in-law, were killed in police custody. For the group, 
this has meant a greater reason to pursue its objectives. Subsequently, the 
sect splintered into several groups and orientations and began a bombing 
offensive against Nigeria (Adesoji 2010; IRIN Africa 2011). Boko Haram—a 
name that in Hausa stands for “Western education is forbidden”—is actu-
ally a nickname for a group known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati 
wal-Jihad, meaning “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s 
teachings and jihad.” Like the Taliban, its targets have been Christians, the 
police, and state officials; it is said to oppose the political elite of the country 
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and Muslim governors in northern Nigeria who are accused of compromising 
Islamic teachings. Adherents wear long beards and red or black headscarves 
and congregate in mosques in Maiduguri, Kano, and Sokoto states (The 
Telegraph 2011).
Boko Haram has built on preceding religious crises in northern Nigeria. 
A glaring example was the Maitatsine riots of 1980 in Kaduna, 1984 in Yola, 
and 1985 in Bauchi. These were the first attempts by an Islamic group to 
impose a religious ideology on the secular Nigerian state. Similar sectarian 
crises and riots followed at irregular intervals. The reasons given for these 
crises are to curtail the excesses of opposing groups or prevent them from 
being security threats; these were the causes of the Maitatsine uprisings 
(Adesoji 2010). Other reasons are conversion drives by one religious group 
and resistance by another. This, for example, was the case with the Kano riot 
of 1991, when Muslims complained of preferential treatment in the approval 
of a religious crusade for Christians and the use of Kano Race Course, which 
had not been approved for a similar event to be held by Muslims (Adesoji 
2010:97; Albert 1999).
Boko Haram appears to take after Maitatsine in philosophy, objec-
tives, organizational structure, and armed resistance, whose aims have been 
viewed as the cumulative consequences of insecurity, poverty, deprivation, 
and income inequalities (Adesoji 2010). Other reasons are closely linked 
with Islam and local disasters, including drought, the rinderpest (cattle 
plague) pandemic, and the impact of the success of the 1979 revolution in 
Iran (Adesoji 2010; Stock 2004). Boko Haram insists on a strict adoption 
of Islamic law (Sharia) in all parts of the country, particularly the north, 
where its activities have been most profound. It rejects everything Western, 
including education and a social lifestyle, and has carried out attacks on beer 
halls and pubs. According to Al Jazeera, one of its attacks—on a beer hall 
in Maiduguri in June 2011—left twenty-five people dead and fifteen others 
injured. There have been widespread speculations that Boko Haram has links 
to international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and that it has the 
potential to link with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which operates in 
other African regions, such as Somalia. The group is said to have split into 
three factions operating in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and to have links 
to terrorist groups in North Africa (Onuah and Eboh 2011). It has expanded 
its operations and influence beyond its initial ethnic and geographical base 
because some Nigerian militants have been engaged by Ancar Dine—an 
armed Islamist group in northeast Mail, called defenders of the faith—to 
teach members of Timbuktu’s population the Salafi practice of Islam (Tan-
chum 2012). After the declaration of independence of Northern Mali in April 
2012, Boko Haram was said to have joined forces with the Tuaregs. Reports in 
the media (for example, antiwarnews.com) suggest that the Nigerian Muja-
hedeen have joined forces with their Malian counterparts under the Tuaregs’ 
control of the city of Gao (Ditz 2012). Boko Haram has been said to constitute 
the majority of a militant group that attacked the Algerian consulate in Gao, 
in which seven Algerian diplomats were kidnapped (The Punch 2012).
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Most of the attacks carried out in Nigeria in 2011 and early 2012 by 
Boko Haram targeted Maiduguri in Borno state, Damaturu in Yobe state, and 
Jos in Plateau state. In 2011 alone, the sect was responsible for more than 
four hundred ninety killings (allafrica.com 2010). In the north before and 
after the general elections of April 2011, bombings that left many people dead 
were blamed on this extremist movement. On 16 June, the group claimed 
responsibility for bombing the police headquarters in Abuja. The attack was 
said to be the first suicide bombing in Nigeria’s history. Ten days later, the 
sect carried out a bomb attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri. According to 
the Daily Telegraph, witnesses reported that militants on motorcycles had 
thrown explosives into the drinking spot, targeting people relaxing there. 
The next day, another bombing in Maiduguri attributed to the group killed 
at least two girls and wounded three customs officials. Similar bombings at 
beer gardens, banks, hotels, and police stations became frequent occurrences 
in Northern Nigeria throughout 2011, leaving many people dead and others 
injured. A Boko Haram spokesman told The Daily Trust that it had been 
responsible for the attacks and promised more. Additional attacks included 
the bombing of the UN headquarters at Abuja on 26 August, leaving at least 
twenty-three people dead and about one hundred sixteen wounded.
Also of note were attacks on Christian churches. On 10 July 2011, the 
All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger state, was bombed, killing 
many worshippers. Attacks in Jos killed thirty-two Christians and injured 
seventy-four. The St. Theresa Roman Catholic Church in Madalla, a town 
in Niger state, was bombed on 25 December 2011, killing at least thirty-
nine worshippers after the morning mass. These killings stood alongside 
shootings of Christian worshippers, journalists, students, and politicians. 
The Madalla terrorist attack attracted widespread condemnations, locally 
and internationally.
This paper examines the reactions of people who twittered and com-
mented on these events in Nigeria, especially Nigerians, including tweets 
by self-acclaimed sect members who twittered on the Boko Haram Twitter 
profile page. The main questions this paper addresses are what pragmatic 
strategies or acts are applied by tweeters and those who comment on media 
reports about the bombings and how knowledge of these strategies enhances 
our understanding of the functions of pragmatic acts in specific sociocultural 
settings, especially during crises.
Twitter and Twittering
Twitter is a type of microblogging that has been popular since 2006 and 
became the most rapidly growing Internet brand in 2010, with about fifty 
million tweets a day being posted during the first half of the year (Crystal 
2011). Members may send and receive posts or tweets of up to one hundred 
forty characters. Often referred to as the SMS of the Internet, tweets are 
displayed on the author’s profile page and delivered to the author’s followers 
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and may be read by anyone. As an Internet-based microblogging tool, Twitter 
enables users to comment on and share brief messages about social situa-
tions, report and respond to ongoing events, contribute to discussions, and 
share their interests and activities among friends and followers. People find 
Twitter easy to use because of the brevity of its messages and its multiplat-
form input method; since its emergence, twittering has served for conver-
sational exchanges, collaboration among users with common interests and 
goals, coordination of events, and the dissemination of news and information 
(Ifukor 2010:401).
Scholarly studies have established the uses, linguistic contents, styles, 
and technology of twittering as one of the fastest-growing members of the 
new social media. Zanzotto, Pennacchiotti, and Tsioutsiouliklis (2011), for 
instance, investigate linguistic redundancy in Twitter and present four key 
results: the definition of the problem of redundancy detection in microblogs 
within the framework of textual-entailment theory; the provision of quanti-
tative evidence of the pervasiveness of redundancy in Twitter; the presenta-
tion of a set of simple and effective machine-learning models for solving the 
task of redundancy detection; and the provision of promising experimental 
results that show that these models outperform baseline approaches. Simi-
larly, Honeycutt and Herring (2009) emphasize the conversationality of Twit-
ter as it supports user-to-user exchanges and as a tool for collaboration: the 
symbol @ followed by a user name identifies the history of a semantic thread, 
signaling a reaction to a tweet on the user’s page; the syntax of @user directs 
conversations to other tweeters and addresses messages to them.
Subasic and Berendt (2011) investigate the role of social media in news 
reporting and conclude that social media do not necessarily create news, 
but extend news through comments. Thus, social media encourage citizen 
journalism. A citizen journalist is a person who reports or comments but 
is not paid for his or her work. Hermida (2010), however, argues that Twit-
ter makes data available to parajournalists and can be situated within the 
trend in citizen journalism and as a system of communication with its own 
media logic, shapes, and structures. New forms of journalism are being 
created by the characteristic features of microblogging, emphasizing one 
of the influences of the Internet on journalism practices and changing the 
definition of journalism. Twitter is viewed as an awareness system like other 
forms of computer-mediated communication systems, intended to help 
people construct and maintain awareness of each other’s activity, context, or 
status, even when they are not at the same location (Hermida 2010). There-
fore, microblogging can be discussed in the context of citizen journalism, 
where individuals perform functions of professional journalists, which often 
include providing first accounts, images, or videos of an event (Ingram 2008). 
Twitter is suitable for five categories of real-time information: news, pre-
news, rumors, the formation of social media and subject-based networks, and 
molecular searching using granular data-mining tools (Leinweber 2009:204).
Twitter has been used to champion and mobilize offline social and 
political protests around the world, especially in the Arab Moslem world. 
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The Egyptian revolution, for example, has been described as a Twitter revolu-
tion because of the function Twitter served in it: primarily as an alternative 
press, “a place for emancipating bursts of self-expression” (Idle and Nunn 
2011:139). Many tweeters saw themselves as citizen journalists, but profes-
sional journalists used Twitter to transmit news and pictures. Like other 
activists and protesters in the North African and Arab world’s uprisings, 
planning discussions happened, and activists talked to each other, mobi-
lized protesters, and announced new initiatives on Twitter; these activities 
boosted their collective morale with reports of other developments around 
the country. Hence, the evolution of the social media has marked the 
beginning of sociopolitical revolutions (Shirky 2009).
In Nigeria, political associations and social and civil-rights groups have 
utilized the Internet and networking sites as media for political participation 
(Chiluwa 2011b, 2012a). Ifukor (2010) investigates the linguistic construc-
tion of textual messages in blogs and Twitter in the Nigerian 2007 electoral 
cycle comprising the April 2007 general elections and the rerun elections in 
April, May, and August 2009; his study concludes that access to social media, 
both blogging and microblogging, enhances political participation of the 
citizens, who are also the electorates. In an article on social media networks 
and the discourse of resistance, Chiluwa (2012b) points out that the social 
media have been utilized by Biafra campaign groups to advance online activ-
ism so as to achieve sociopolitical and economic independence for the Igbo 
of southeastern Nigeria. The current study focuses on tweets and how their 
discursive contents reveal pragmatic acts, explicitly or implicitly, in support 
or rejection of Boko Haram. Further, it focuses on comments posted on the 
Internet by readers of online reports about the uprisings and bomb attacks.
Pragmatic Acts
The word pragmatics can be defined as “the investigation into that aspect of 
meaning which is derived not from the formal properties of words, but from 
the way in which utterances are used and how they relate to the context in 
which they are uttered” (Leech and Short 1981:290). Hence, pragmatics basi-
cally deals with inferred content, an add-on to semantic content, or what Yule 
(1996) calls invisible meaning. Inferred content, as the definition highlights, is 
the meaning that depends not just on the grammar or the lexicon, but on the 
context in which the message occurs. For example, if we tell someone who 
has just entered our office “The door is open,” he or she is likely to interpret 
our message not as mere information about the door, but as a request to close 
the door. Second, advice such as “Throw out those old shoes” is unlikely to 
mean “Just throw the shoes out the window,” but “Put the shoes in the trash” 
or “Give the shoes away to the needy.” In this manner, pragmatic messages 
usually have more than one interpretation, mostly depending on how relevant 
the hearer or reader perceives the information communicated. According to 
Sperber and Wilson (1995), the hearer or reader can pick out the most relevant 
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pragmatic message when given the exact situation, what is known about the 
speaker or writer, and what has already been said or written. Pragmatic mes-
sages depend on background information as part of the context—that is, what 
the speaker or writer and hearer or reader knows about the society involved 
and what has happened in the past.
When individuals communicate using language, they perform acts 
(or actions) at the same time, serving the functions of ordering, pleading, 
promising, or inviting (Searle 1969). Utterances or written expressions do 
not merely provide information for the hearer or reader: they perform prag-
matic acts, usually not explicitly stated, such as implicit identification with 
certain people, implicit denials or denunciations of a group, projection of 
identity, and so forth (Mey 2001). In the examples given above, the acts of 
requesting and advising (or ordering) are performed. Pragmatic acts are usu-
ally performed in all contexts where human beings interact with one another 
in speech or writing and do not have to include any specific act of speech, 
such as those proposed by John L. Austin (1975), to be understood as act or 
action. For example, soliciting an invitation or a compliment can be done 
without saying anything that may be identified as a direct speech act (Mey 
2001:213). Mey proposes “a theory of action (for the study of pragmatic acts) 
that specifies, for any given situation, the limitations and possibilities of the 
situation” (2001:214). Pragmatic acts are then viewed in two dimensions: the 
agent and the act. In considering the agent, factors such as class, gender, age, 
education, and so forth become important because they are “the resources 
that people dispose of as members of the community[,] often referred to as 
background knowledge” (2001:214). These resources may be characterized 
as “constraints and affordances imposed on the individual in the form of 
necessary limitations on the degree of freedom that he or she is allowed in 
society” (2001:214). In other words, individuals do not just perform speech 
acts on their own without reference to the context and the level of freedom 
or affordances that are allowed by the society to perform such acts. The act is 
the language used in performing the pragmatic act with reference to specific 
acts in specific contexts (from the individual’s perspective) and the language 
that may be used to create the conditions for performing a pragmatic act 
(from the perspective of the context).1 In sum, “the pragmatic acting can be 
considered as adapting oneself linguistically and otherwise to one’s world,” 
and “all our acting is done in that world and within the affordances it puts 
at our disposal” (2001:215).
In our analysis of the data in this study, we adopt a methodology that 
identifies pragmatic acts such as identifying with or coopting, denounc-
ing, rejecting, or implicitly denying, performed by tweeters and responders 
within the context of reactions to the bombings in Nigeria. Our analysis 
begins by systematically categorizing the data according to kinds of prag-
matic act; however, some objective speech acts or indirect speech acts are 
identified and analyzed to achieve a comprehensive qualitative analysis of 
the goal of discourse of tweeters who are themselves the direct or indirect 
victims of the bombings.
In
n
o
C
e
n
t C
h
Ilu
w
A
 A
n
d
 A
d
e
t
u
n
jI A
d
e
g
o
k
e
89
africa
TO
D
A
Y
 59
(3)Categorization of Samples and Analyses
The corpus comprises two hundred ninety-one tweets and comments or reac-
tions that are categorized and analyzed. The data are broken down as follows:
Tweets from Boko Haram Twitter profile page 140
Comments on Daily Telegraph reports 109 
of the bombings
Individual tweeters 25
Comments and reactions on Mail & Guardian Online  
reports of the bombings 17
Total 291
For the limited space of this paper, selected tweets and comments from 
each group that aptly capture the common goal or act of the group are repro-
duced. Table 1 enumerates pragmatic acts performed in the tweet samples 
in the corpus. Tweets on the Boko Haram tweeter profile, for example, 
include tweeters sympathetic to the Boko Haram struggle. At the time of 
this research, there were a total of one hundred forty tweets, with many 
tweeters being self-styled or self-acclaimed members of the sect, but it is 
not certain that these tweeters were real members of the sect. Their tweets 
celebrate the activities of the terrorist group and call on Nigerian youths to 
join the struggle. In the analyses, Twt stands for “tweet,” while Cmt stands 
for “comment.
This categorization is similar to Searle’s (1969) categorization of speech 
acts into representative (describing, asserting, claiming, reporting, suggesting), 
directive (commanding, requesting, inviting), and commissive (challenging, 
promising, threatening, offering, vowing, warning). In this research, however, 
the identified pragmatic acts are not overt speech acts, since most of the acts 
are implied and are deducible from the context as the writer’s intention.2 Most 
of the tweets and comments in the data were responses to the Boko Haram 
uprising; however, many that condemned and denounced Islam and those that 
supported the breaking up of Nigeria resulted from the bombing of the Roman 
Catholic church at Madalla on Christmas day in 2011.
Table 1. Speech and pragmatic acts.
Speech and Pragmatic Acts Occurrences in the 
Corpus (%)
Accusing & blaming the Nigerian government 16.4
Condemning & denouncing Islam (and violence) 18.0
Accusing & blaming the West 2.6
Demanding splitting the country 8.0
Supporting & identifying with Boko Haram & Islam 40.0
Solution proffering (advice to Muslims and the govt.) 3.0
Neutral 2.1
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Acts of Accusing and Blaming
The acts under this category are explicit and implicit accusations that the 
Nigerian government was the cause of the crises; hence, the failure of politi-
cal leadership is blamed for the crimes and insecurity in the nation. In other 
words, the Boko Haram attacks are a reaction to suffering and unemployment 
of the youth because of the government’s failure to improve living standards 
for its population. Cmt2 below, for example, uses a strong metaphor (killers) 
for Nigerian leaders. Cmt7 explicitly accuses the government of sponsoring 
the terrorist sect, with the use of a direct speech act of accusing, equivalent 
to Searle’s (1969) commissive act of warning or threatening.
Cmt2. Now we are talking about bomb blast which we dont 
know the source and where this blast is coming from, though 
i know we NIGERIA dont have Leaders but we only have 
KILLERS as a leader to rule us. Those that only care about 
themselves and their family, in these same Nigeria we are 
unemployed up to 90% graduates have no job after graduating 
from their various schools . . .
Cmt7. I don’t think the BOKO HAMA should be blamed 
for this instead the GOVERNMENT who are financing the 
boko haram should be blamed and the so called Mr. President 
GOODLUCK. No good amenities, no standard way of living 
in Nigeria but instead of the government to do the right thing 
by providing security and social amenities but they are speak-
ing on how to increase fuel prices and speaking about removal 
fuel subsidiary
Nigeria’s underdevelopment has often been attributed to corruption and 
incompetent political leadership. According to a World Bank report (2010), 
Nigeria earns more than $10 billion annually; however, the population living 
on less than $1.40 a day rose to 67.1 million in 1996 (up from 17.7 million in 
1982). The country witnessed growth of the GDP from $170.7 billion in 2005 
to $292.6 billion in 2007. GDP per capita rose from $692 per person in 2006 
to $1,754 in 2007 (Chiluwa 2011b; economist.com 2012). Unfortunately, 
the economy is still far from improving the living standards of the people, 
mainly as result of social politics, corruption, and a lack of sincerity by those 
in power. This state of affairs has provided the main argument and strong 
point for the apologists of Boko Haram resistance. The writers of Twt50 and 
Twt52, for example, are probably members of the sect who see themselves 
as heroes. Attacks on public facilities and the police are implicitly viewed 
as revolutionary efforts to rescue the people from an oppressive political 
system. The government is viewed as the terrorist, while Boko Haram 
members have come to the rescue and are viewed as freedom fighters.
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Twt50. @Boko_Haran. How many jets does the president have? 
How many jobs would that have created? Boko Haram to the 
rescue (#wherewedarethread)
Twt52. @Boko_Haran. The government is the terrorist. When 
last did you have light for 24 hrs? Boko Haram are the freedom 
fighters.
Twt7 represents the widespread speculation that Boko Haram must have 
been sponsored by certain interests in the government, possibly the northern 
political elite, who are said to aim at destabilizing the country and discredit-
ing the Jonathan government. Later events in Nigeria lent credence to this 
assumption. A member of the Nigerian parliament (a northerner) was named 
a sponsor of the sect by the accused mastermind of the Madalla bomb blasts. 
At the time of this research, the accused persons were still standing trial for 
their involvement in terrorist attacks. This tweet, while performing an overt 
speech act of accusing, represents a pragmatic act of dissociation from the 
Nigerian government and full identification with the Nigerian people. This 
is clearly implied in Twt50: “how many jets does the president have? How 
many jobs would that have created?”
Among these accusations are those that blame the government for its 
tardiness in handling Boko Haram. According to many tweets and comments 
(e.g., Cmt1 and Cmt 3 below), the government has been neither proactive nor 
radical in confronting Nigeria’s security challenges. Many tweeters believe 
that Boko Haram could have been dealt with decisively by the Nigerian 
government, but the government is slow to protect certain interests, or 
simply incompetent.
Cmt1. . . . new colonizers are already destroying and ripping 
our countries apart, as the authorities look idly, and our politi-
cians fear reprisals and losing votes, never attempting to con-
front and destroy this evil cancer called Islam . . . (Cruzado7)
Cmt3. There is a lot for our so called Govt to know about 
because if NIGERIA as a whole cannot control the citizen of 
their country, then we are not safe. Look at the bomb blast 
during election period where most people lost their lives, most 
especially the corps during their services and follows by the 
bomb blast by BOKO HARAM killing the Christians. (festy1)
The pragmatic act of denouncing the Nigerian government and Islam can be 
deduced from the two strong metaphors for Islam in Cmt1: ”new colonizers” 
and “this evil cancer.” The tone is that of anger and frustration. In the two 
comments, the government is said to “look idly” for fear of “losing votes” 
in subsequent elections, thus unable to “control the citizen [sic] of their 
country.” The consequence of inaction is the loss of lives in the bomb blasts.
Cmt4 attributes the Boko Haram insurgency to poor handling of the 
terrorist challenge by the government of Yar’Adua. As pointed out in the 
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introduction, the Nigerian military carried out indiscriminate attacks on 
the sect members in 2009, killing hundreds of them. Rather than curb the 
activities of the terrorist group, this action fueled its growth. The tweeter 
here blames the government for failing to bring the sect members to justice, 
rather than killing them. This tweet implies that the Muslim radicals were 
fighting not only for the Islamization of the north, but also to exact revenge 
for their members who had been killed, especially their founding leader, 
killed in police custody. This was followed by widespread rumors that the 
Boko Haram leader had secretly been murdered because he was about to 
make important revelations about the insurgency’s operations and sponsors; 
these revelations would have exposed the group’s political sponsors and 
implicated government officials said to be directly or indirectly involved in 
acts of terrorism. The writer of Cmt4 appears to have some sympathy for the 
Islamic radicals and is perhaps a Nigerian passionate about the revitalization 
of the Nigerian judiciary.
Cmt4. I think the problem was when the crisis of boko haram 
first began the late government didn’t handle it well, reason 
it allowed the killings of many boko haram fighters in public 
and let the video been shown to the whole world, so instead 
of bringing them to justice the late government go other way 
and that led to the crises, may god help Nigeria
Pragmatic acts of accusing and blaming thus attribute the Boko Haram 
insurgency to poor government, which has left citizens with no choice but 
to revolt. This is not different from the Northern African revolution and the 
so-called Arab Spring, which stand on the verge of achieving major political 
changes by withdrawing power from despots. The implication of this social 
interpretation of events in Nigeria stems from the assumption that social 
events are the products of the society itself: crime is a direct consequence 
of suffering, and so the Boko Haram terrorists represent suffering Nigerians 
who cannot fight for themselves.
Acts of Denouncing and Condemning Islam and Boko Haram
Expectedly, the second-highest number of tweets and comments in the data 
are those that denounce Islam and Boko Haram. Many of the tweets contain 
strong words and highly negative metaphors to describe the Islamic religion 
and the radical sect. Cmt1, as pointed out above, describes Islam as an evil 
cancer—which implies that the writer could not have been a Muslim. In 
this group are tweets sent by tweeters who perhaps are direct victims of the 
attacks or whose loved ones were. The pragmatic act of denouncing Boko 
Haram is performed with many obvious emotional Christian voices in the 
tweets, with the usual ideological assumption that Islam is bad and Christi-
anity is good, where Islam represents “them” and Christianity is “we” (van 
Dijk 2005). Undoubtedly, this is a plausible argument, following the massive 
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shootings and bombings of churches and Christian assemblies in northern 
Nigeria in 2011. These events prompted a warning issued by the President 
of the Christian Association of Nigeria to the bombers and the instruction 
to Christians to defend themselves against further attacks. Tension rose, 
and people began to fear an imminent breakup of the nation. In some of the 
tweets, we and us refer to Christians, while they and them refer to Islam 
and Boko Haram. Twt10, for example, referring to Nigeria, says: “it is not a 
Muslim country, the south is mainly Christian and peaceful.” The pragmatic 
act here assumes that a Muslim country is expectedly nonpeaceful, going 
by the Nigerian experience. Twt18 argues “there is no such thing as a good 
Muslim . . . just good hypocrites,” thus denouncing Muslims. This does not, 
of course, imply that the writer is a Christian or an African traditional reli-
gionist; he or she might be a free thinker who intended to express an opinion. 
Other tweets or comments in this category (for example, Cmt7, Cmt12, and 
Cmt13) perform similar acts of denouncing Islam. Cmt7 is feedback from 
online reports of the attacks.
Cmt7. Islam is totally to blame for this. Muslims admit it. 
LEAVE Islam, leave the hatred, the lies, the denials, the sub-
terfuges, the lame excuses behind your back and join mankind 
as our equal brothers and sisters. Stop killing us and stop 
destroying yourselves. If there is a hell all devout Muslims 
will burn there surely. It is time to ACT as a true human 
civilized human being and stop with this madness, insanity 
and satanic way of thinking/acting...it is time to stop Islam 
totally and eternally.
Cmt12. I have read the Koran and Hadith and have studied the 
bible for more than 20 years. . . . I can tell you without reser-
vation that Mohammed was simply a warlord who wanted to 
take over Mecca and used a mixture of Paganism, Judaism and 
Christianity to get his followers to kill and be killed
Cmt13. I despise Islam and everything related to it. It is 
the most inhuman, anti-God, anti-love, anti-science BS 
poison EVER! It must be fought and eradicated worldwide, so 
mankind can evolve and prosper.
The writers of the above comments and others in this category are no 
doubt non-Muslims who blame the Boko Haram insurgence on Islam. They 
therefore reject the explanation that Islam is a peaceful religion. Cmt12, for 
example, attributes the religious intolerance of Muslim terrorists to a culture 
of killing that stems from the founder of Islam. Interestingly, Cmt15 argues 
that Muslims themselves are killed by the so-called Jihadists—which again 
raises the question as to who the Jihadists really are.
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Cmt15. Jihadists kill more Muslims than anyone. Mus-
lims everywhere should stalk and kill Jihadist like animals. 
Apologists for Jihad should serve as each other’s virgins.
While many tweeters in this category denounce Islam as the breeder of 
terrorists, others sympathize with Muslims who are themselves victims of 
some of the attacks. The writers therefore urge well-meaning Muslims to 
denounce the attacks and quit Islam. Twt23, for example says: “enough lies 
my friend . . . If you want to become truly peaceful and civilized, you have 
to leave Islam now, before it’s too late.”
Acts of Supporting and Identifying with Islam and Boko Haram
Surprisingly, about 40 percent of the corpus comprises tweets that directly 
or indirectly support the Boko Haram uprising. More than 90 percent of the 
tweets on the Boko Haram profile page pledge support and celebrate the ter-
rorist group’s activities. It is uncertain, however, whether all the tweeters 
on this page are Boko Haram members; some may just be youths bragging 
about the sect’s radical approach and making fun of the incidents. Many 
tweets attempt to defend the Islamic religion and project its positive con-
tributions. Many comments or tweets seem to promote Islam as a peaceful 
religion, whose real attributes have been undermined by terrorists who are 
not real Muslims. Most of the tweets below perform the pragmatic acts of 
associating and identifying with Islam; some of the comments excuse the 
activities of Boko Haram.
Twt36. Majority of people here talking about Islam has no clue 
about this religion . . . if they found a dead penguin in the north 
pole they will blame it on Islam . . .
Twt37. The sum of all victims of Boko Haram and Al Qaeda 
over the past decade is less than what US killed in IRAQ in 
one year
Twt38. I hate Christianity
Twt39. Islam is a religion of peace, these people does not 
represent the thousands of millions of Muslims, we are also 
feelings bad when innocent people are dying!!
Twt40. Suicide is forbidden in Islam. Islam is the religion of 
peace. Those who does killing by act of suicide will go to hell
Twt41. Mohammed is Allah’s apostle. Those who follow him 
are ruthless to the unbelievers but merciful to one another” 
Quran 48:29.
The tweets quoted above merely attempt to represent the positive side of 
Islam; the pragmatic message they carry is that the activities of Boko Haram 
do not represent true Islamic principles. While promoting Islam as “the 
religion of peace” (Twt40), an Islamic apologist claims that real Muslims 
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actually feel bad when innocent people are killed (Twt39) and that those who 
kill by suicide will “go to hell” (Twt40). Twt41 appears as a contradiction 
to the Maiduguri bombings, in which Christians and Muslims were killed; 
it carries the pragmatic message that the agents of the Maiduguri bombings 
could not be good Moslems. In contrast, Cmt15 (above) admits that the 
bombers were jihadists (Muslims) who kill Muslims.
Tweets in this category consist of the radical claims of Boko Haram 
tweeters as they define their mission (for example, Twt70) and showcase 
positive results of the attacks and bombings in the north and Abuja (for 
example, Twt80). This suggests that their mission has been achieved to some 
extent. The tweets demonstrate defiant and unrepentant voices of anger 
and contumacy, justifying their actions and urging youths passionate about 
Nigeria’s future to join their struggle.
Twt70. @Boko_Haran. We love Nigerians; it’s only the Nige-
rian polis, Nigerian army, drunkards, prostitutes, politicians, 
usurers, teachers, touts we can’t stand.
Twt71. @Boko_Haran. Army people you are hungry, polis you 
are tired. Go home.
We are your friends. Our enemies are the infidels at Aso Rock 
#gaskiya
Twt70 appears to explain the indiscriminate bombings of pubs and social 
gatherings in the north. Twt80 through Twt84 catalogue the so-called 
achievements of the radical group: the restoration of social sanity and 
quietness in cities, the restoration of marriages or family reunions, a reduc-
tion in alcohol consumption, and an improvement in the people’s general 
well-being.
Twt80. @Boko_Haran. Pls come to Maiduguri to see the good 
job we have done. quiet. no siren. no thieves only us, polis and 
army. #tourism
Twt81. @Boko_Haran. Wives and children now see their 
husbands in the night in Abuja and Maiduguri. Countless 
marriages have been saved #collateraleffect
Twt82. @Boko_Haran. Rate of alcoholism has reduced in Abuja 
and Maiduguri because of our good work #collateraleffect
Twt83. @Boko_Haran. Maiduguri looks better with our 
fireworks. roads look more even and streets quieter 
#collateraleffect
Twt84. @Boko_Haran. Also, none of those horrible music 
again from dbanj, terryyg, wbanky, wande coal and duncan 
might . . . dan maraya jos rules #goodmusicisbliss
They project some of their goals, among which are the complete banning 
of cigarette smoking and replacing it with sheesha,3 which they claim is 
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healthier and has more vitamins (Twt87). Second, there would be a complete 
ban on wearing jeans, T-shirts, and Tmlewin shirts, to be replaced with Jela-
bia,4 which they claim is more suitable for the Maiduguri sun (Twt88). Most 
of the tweets denounce the police and the Nigerian government and promise 
further attacks; some appeal to the police and security agents to defect to the 
Boko Haram. They describe the government as the real terrorists (Twt42). 
More significant is the redefinition of terrorism or terrorist, which the sect 
gives to this term: rather than view a terrorist as someone who commits 
a criminal act intended to provoke terror in the general public or who for 
political, religious, ethnic, or ideological purpose in unjustifiable circum-
stances causes harm or destroys people’s lives (Chiluwa 2011a), Boko Haram 
defines terrorism from a moral and religious perspective in which “terrorists 
are those who drink all day and don’t take care of their families [and] women 
who sell their bodies” (Twt62), or “those who go to western schools to learn 
how to thief money [and] learn to bribe from there” (Twt63), or those “who 
steal government funds [and] refuse to maintain roads” (Twt65). Thus, the 
Nigerian government is described as infidels who kill people by fraud and 
corruption (Twt66), and Nigeria is called a joke: the government, the police, 
and the army are jokers because “they kill more innocent people everyday 
than Boko Haram has done in a year” (Twt67).
Twt42. @Boko_Haramm.The government is the terrorist. 
When last did you have light for 24 hrs? Boko Haram are the 
freedom fighters.
Twt44. @Boko_Haran. MEND is after money, we are after 
ideals. Ideas that come at the right time flourishes. #deadideals
Twt87.@Boko_Haran. Boko Haram thinking of replacing ciga-
rettes with sheesha .  .  . Helthier and with more vitamins. 
#PROGRESS
Twt88. @Boko_Haran. We are thinking of banning jeans, 
Tshirt and Tmlewin shirts . . . Jebabia is more suitable to the 
Maiduguri sun and for banks. #1STEPAHEAD
Boko Haram claims it is in pursuit of ideals, rather than money, unlike 
some rebel groups in Nigeria (Twt44), and it tends to provide ideological 
and logical arguments for its resistance against the Nigerian state. But the 
question remains: must the realization of these ideals, no matter how logical 
they sound, justify the reckless destruction of lives and property like those 
characteristic of the bombings of Christian churches and public property?
Acts of Accusing and Blaming the West
The Boko Haram tweets, like other tweets and comments in the corpus, not 
only accuse the Nigerian government of responsibility in the social problems 
of Nigeria, but accuse, condemn, and blame the Western world, especially 
the United States, in Nigeria’s underdevelopment and security challenges. 
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Two of the responses or comments are reproduced below. These summarize 
the other comments and tweets in this group, which accuse the West of 
selfishly pursuing its own interest in Africa, and not being interested in 
stabilizing African democracy.
Cmt26 . . . The reason why the West supports Islam is because 
it favors the West’s agenda of dominating the region, without 
Islam Arabs would be “free thinker.” West does not need 
anybody to think free, the whole idea of democracy is a scam. 
Please people open you eye already, and instead calling Obama 
and the West Muslims, call it what it is, INTEREST. We are 
not kids. (49fiori)
Cmt27. Partly true, the western politicians indeed only care 
about our minerals, resources. and they fake they defend 
democracy, using the media, to brainwash the public opinion 
and advance obscure materialistic, greedy interests of the cor-
porations that support them. Their alliance to Islam is purely 
material, not ideological because all they care about is money 
and power. If Islam helps getting it, they will side with Islam, 
but if Islam fights it, they will try something else. (cruzado7)
The arguments advanced by the writers of the above comments are not 
saying anything new, because this has been the popular thinking of many 
scholars who critically examine the philosophies of materialism and the 
global economy and how they are being pursued in Africa and the Arab 
world (Rodney 1973), but calling to mind this argument at such a time 
when an Islamic sect is terrorizing Nigeria is indirectly or pragmatically 
denouncing and accusing the West of supporting or abetting terrorist acts. 
While this sounds like a baseless accusation, Cmt26 insists that the “West 
does not need anyone to think free”: in other words, if Obama and the 
West sincerely mean to isolate Islam, they will be weakened, and their 
power and influence (including terrorism) will diminish; hence, Islam is 
powerful today because it enjoys Western support. Cmt27 argues that the 
West supports Islam because of its money and economic power; similarly 
in Africa, it pretends to defend democracy, whereas it cares “only about 
our minerals resources .  .  . using the media to brainwash public opinion 
and advance .  .  . greedy interest of the corporations that support them.” 
But again the question is why writers express anger against the West when 
Boko Haram is bombing Nigeria. Two implications here are clear: (1) Boko 
Haram terrorists are Islamists, and there is something the West, as a world 
power, ought to do to curb Islamic power, which the West is not doing for 
fear of jeopardizing its economic interests; (2) the West is singing the song 
of democracy and freedom, but Islam is engaged in acts of terrorism, which 
violate not only people’s freedom but their fundamental right to life, yet the 
West appears not to be doing enough to enforce and sustain global freedom. 
The pragmatic acts of dissociating from the West are quite obvious from the 
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acts of accusing and condemning the West, especially the United States, for 
its failed role as global watchdog.
Demanding That the Country Be Split
Some tweets reflect one of the main objectives of Boko Haram: that an 
independent Islamic state of northern Nigeria be created. An assertive state-
ment such as “Nigeria is a joke” (Twt67) or “we have left Nigeria; we are 
in boko republic of Arewa [and the] infidel Nigerian government and Kafiri 
army should leave us” (Twt91) is not only a pragmatic act of dissociation 
but an assertive claim. Recent negotiations between the federal government, 
represented by the Supreme Council for Sharia, and a Boko Haram spokes-
man broke down, following what the radical sect described as insincerity on 
the part of the government. One faction, consisting of the late Mohammed 
Yusuf’s immediate followers, was willing to negotiate, and it had presented 
its demands (the punishment of Yusuf’s killers, the restoration of seized 
Boko Haram property, and the release of jailed Boko Haram members), but 
the other faction had demanded the introduction of Islamic law in parts 
of Nigeria—a demand that the government could not accede to (Campbell 
2012).
The call for the breakup of Nigeria has been made by other non-
Muslim tweeters. It brings to mind previous agitation by Biafra campaign 
groups that still seek a separate state for the Igbos of southeastern Nigeria 
(Chiluwa 2012b; Ojukwu 2009). Boko Haram’s demand for the Arewa Islamic 
state appears to have revitalized the Igbo dream for political independence. 
Some tweets or comments are apparently Biafran voices reiterating Biafran 
demands. Here are a few examples:
Cmt28. More death for innocent Christians; that will teach 
them to be different in a Muslim country. (original11319)
Cmt29. Sick nation, dysfunction country. Separation the only 
solution to Nigeria’s problem. (OLU1973)
Cmt30. This Uprising will bring out the BIAFRA in us. To 
achieve a great nation everybody is expendable. This is a path 
to a new Nation. BIAFRA. (ILLuminatik)
Cmt31. The mission of Boko Haram is crystal clear, imposing 
Islam on all Nigerians. The question is, must the Muslims 
and Christians be forced to live under one country? Let U.N. 
divide the country into two, one for Christians and the other 
for Muslims. Otherwise, for any soul lost, Ban Ki Mo should 
be held responsible. (shinayode)
Cmt32. There is no alternative to the splitting of Nigeria. 
it is an artificial unity anyway. Christians have the right to 
have safe lifes and live in peae and prosperity, without being 
subject to constant mass-murdering attacks by their Muslim 
henchmen. (Cruzado7)
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Cmt33.Nigeria has no identity of true nationhood . . . if the 
UN is truly a global institution, let UN show concern about 
murders in Nigeria. . . . Ban Kimoon is just seating there as a 
puppet, reading speeches given to him—like the same speech 
Hamid Karzai read out loudly on occasional basis. . . . Once 
Nigeria gets it right by breaking up like India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, the region will know peace and progress. (alvidor)
In Cmt28, Nigeria is called a Muslim country when in reality it is not. 
This again reveals the kind of sarcastic reactions from people who appear 
desperate to break Nigeria up. To the tweeter, the death of innocent Chris-
tians would teach the southern Christians to be different—performing the 
pragmatic act of warning. The writers of Cmt31 and tweet33 blame the 
United Nations for the killings in Nigeria on account of the UN’s ineptitude 
in responding to the crisis in the country, and the only action that these 
writers advocate is the breakup of Nigeria. This shows that both a section 
of the Muslim north and a section of the Christian south demand political 
independence.
Solution Proffering
Tweets under this category, probably from Christian writers, offer a solution 
to the crisis in the form of suggestions or advice to the Boko Haram sect 
and the Nigerian government. The advice is to Muslims, who are asked to 
support secular government and demonstrate their loyalty to “a just God,” 
which does “not discriminate against non-Muslims” (Cmt43):
Cmt43. Good Muslims, please consider what you believe in 
. . . If you believe in a just God, support secular governments 
that do not discriminate against non-Muslims. You’re not 
doing non-Muslims a favor by doing this, but only serving 
YOUR God by supporting a secular state . . . (HugoCorv)
Others believe that the Nigerian government has not been decisive enough 
in tackling Boko Haram; they recommend proactive and drastic actions 
(Twt44), including strengthening the country’s security operations and 
establishing special antiterrorism agencies (Cmt44):
Twt44. #Nigeria ACF on Boko Haram: “We call on the govern-
ment to be more proactive, more decisive and engage in less 
lamentation.” Very correct!
Cmt45. What I’m saying is, he hasn’t done enough yet. I have 
a question? Is there any department responsible for fighting 
terrorism in Nigeria yet? If it’s just the SSS, I think that’s not 
enough . . . (gbesky007)
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Neutral (Acts of Dissociation)
The very few tweets in this group are neutral in terms of their writers’ 
position on religion and the real causes of the uprising, yet they perform 
pragmatic acts. One tweet (Twt47) simply says: “I hate religion,” probably 
because of the numerous sectarian and religious crises that have occurred in 
Nigeria in the recent past. This tweet performs a pragmatic act of dissocia-
tion from religion generally, but also that of implicit blame on religion for 
being responsible for the present and past crises. Twt49, in contrast, argues 
“it is too early to link the attack with anyone . . . there are a lot of dynam-
ics in any region. There cannot be only one reason.” This tweet reflects the 
views of some schools of thought in Nigeria about the Boko Haram crisis. 
Some people even deny the existence of Boko Haram and argue that, indeed, 
the so-called Boko Haram camouflages a more complex political mafia oper-
ating in the federal capital. Others argue that Boko Haram is faceless and 
serves as a political weapon, which powerful politicians deploy to fight their 
opponents, both Christians and Muslims. Another school of thought believes 
that Boko Haram is sponsored by northern enemies of the Jonathan admin-
istration, who are out to destabilize the country and incite a mass uprising 
against the government. These schools have been recognized in the Nigerian 
media. What they have in common is the belief that Boko Haram is not an 
Islamic terrorist group, but this argument cannot easily explain away the 
existence of a complex organization that has terrorized the nation for some 
time and that has sent representatives to make its demands public. This 
study has highlighted some of Boko Haram’s claims of success in northern 
Nigeria in combating crime and immoral behavior, but the claim that Boko 
Haram is not a terrorist group is hardly satisfactory.
Conclusion
This paper concludes that pragmatic acts may be used to express emotions 
both mild and intense, such as anger, delight, rejection, acceptance, and 
denunciation. The selected tweets show how people can reveal their atti-
tudes about significant events by expressing themselves through an informal 
means of communication. The Boko Haram sect applies both speech and 
pragmatic acts to project its position and call for support. Individuals and 
groups express their feelings as victims who have been attacked, directly or 
indirectly. Other tweeters and commenters express their views on how the 
uprisings may be put down. Most of these views are expressed through prag-
matic acts when what needs to be said may not easily be expressed explicitly, 
either by choice or for lack of appropriate words. In times of stress, emotions 
can vary and escalate with the crisis, and in such cases explicit and implicit 
acts are performed to give vent to what people feel.
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noteS
1. For a detailed explanation, see Mey 2001:214–215.
2. In this paper, the texts of tweets and online feedback comments are reproduced exactly as 
they appeared on twitter or the other listed sites; all deviations from standard style are in 
the originals.
3. Sheesha is a type of local tobacco pipe that hausa men smoke, especially during the cold 
season
4. jelabia is a long gown that touches the toes worn by hausa women
5. ‘Maitatsine’ is a nickname for Mohammed Marwa, the late rebel Islamic scholar in northern 
nigeria. Maitatsine in hausa stands for ‘the one who damns’ referring to Marwa’s speeches 
against nigeria.
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